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*The Sources Of Military Doctrine
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POPE RODGERS

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Cornell University Press

The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.

Offense And Defense In Israeli Military Doctrine DIANE Publishing

In this innovative theoretical book, Elizabeth Kier uses a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Kier argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, she demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to constraints, such as terms of conscription set by civilian policymakers. In richly detailed case studies, Kier

examines doctrinal developments in France and Great Britain during the interwar period. She tests her cultural argument against the two most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War I explain the defensive doctrines in World War II. *Imagining War* addresses two important debates. It tackles a central debate in security studies: the origins of military doctrine. And by showing the power of a cultural approach, it offers an alternative to the prevailing rationalist explanations of international politics. Originally published in 1997. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

FORGING THE SWORD

Princeton University Press

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In *The Soul of Armies* Austin Long compares and contrasts

counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army. Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, *The Soul of Armies* demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

Sources of Japanese Military Doctrine Lynne Rienner Publishers

From the foreword: "During the 1980s a fable circulated within the US Army concerning Soviet planning for a potential war with the United States. In the most common version, a Soviet general is alleged to have declared in frustration, "It is impossible to plan against the Americans because they don't follow their own doctrine." Many readers of this book will have heard (or said) that "doctrine is only a guide." Indeed, the tactical agility demonstrated by the US Army on the battle fields of Iraq and Afghanistan is due in no small part to a cultural imperative that prizes solutions above all else. While not disputing the value of

unorthodox solutions to difficult challenges, the organizational culture that underpins this perspective has resulted in a widespread lack of knowledge of Army doctrine by company and field grade officers and mid-level and senior noncommissioned officers. Recognizing this, the Army has dramatically reengineered its doctrine to distill the timeless principles into a series of accessible, easily read documents. This process has led to a larger discussion of what should and should not be called "doctrine," and has also included discussion of how we as members of the profession of arms conceptualize warfare. Unfortunately, this conversation has not yet included the bulk of the Army's mid-level leaders. Dr. Jackson's monograph is an excellent contribution to remedy that shortfall. Its greatest value lies in the fact that it forces the reader to reconsider basic assumptions about the purpose and utility of doctrine, and what a nation's military doctrine says about its military institution. Jackson's arguments are well reasoned, his assertions are provocative, and his conclusions are profound. After reading this work, your view and understanding of doctrine will be powerfully enhanced, and will lead to lively discussions at every level."

THE SOURCES OF MILITARY CHANGE

Lulu.com

ADP 6-22 describes enduring concepts of leadership through the core competencies and attributes required of leaders of all cohorts and all organizations, regardless of mission or setting. These principles reflect decades of experience and validated scientific knowledge. An ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional

competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders' intent and purpose, and in the organization's best interests. Army leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. Every member of the Army, military or civilian, is part of a team and functions in the role of leader and subordinate. Being a good subordinate is part of being an effective leader. Leaders do not just lead subordinates—they also lead other leaders. Leaders are not limited to just those designated by position, rank, or authority.

Soviet Military Doctrine Cornell University Press

This book discusses the existing literature on military doctrines in general, and offensive doctrines in particular, as well as on causes of their stagnation and sources of innovation. It provides the backdrop for an analytical historical review of Israel's offensive military doctrine.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period Stanford University Press

How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been

constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.

CREATING MILITARY POWER

The Sources of Military Doctrine

In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike, right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organization and styles of operations.

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II — Prewar to March 1943 Military Bookshop

As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations, fourteen times. While some modifications have been

incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare—making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.

Army Leadership and the Profession (ADP 6-22) Routledge

The Sources of Military Doctrine Cornell University Press

Restraint University of Chicago Press

Creating Military Power examines how societies, cultures, political structures, and the global environment affect countries' military organizations. Unlike most analyses of countries' military power, which focus on material and basic resources—such as the size of populations, technological and industrial base, and GNP—this volume takes a more expansive view. The study's overarching argument is that states' global environments and the

particularities of their cultures, social structures, and political institutions often affect how they organize and prepare for war, and ultimately impact their effectiveness in battle. The creation of military power is only partially dependent on states' basic material and human assets. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for a country's ability to create military power, but equally important are the ways a state uses those resources, and this often depends on the political and social environment in which military activity takes place.

An Army Transformed Simon and Schuster

Why do competent armies fail? • Why did the American-led coalition in Iraq fail to wage a classic counter-insurgency campaign for so long after the fall of Baghdad? • Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973? • How did a dozen German U-boats manage to humiliate the U.S. Navy for nine months in 1942 -- sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly? • What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War? Since it was first published in 1990, *Military Misfortunes* has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, *Military Misfortunes* will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.

BASIC SOURCES OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

Stanford University Press

This book offers a timely and compelling explanation for the deterioration of U.S.-China security relations during the Obama Presidency. The U.S.-China relationship has become one of (if not the most) vital features of contemporary world politics, and with arrival the Donald Trump to the White House in 2017, this vital geopolitical relationship sits at a precarious and dangerous crossroads. This book assesses a wide array of sources to systematically unpack the policy rhythms, drivers, and dynamics that defined the course of Sino-American security relations during the Obama-era. It fills several gaps in the literature on international security and conflict and offers a nuanced and innovative comparative approach to examine individual military domains. The case study chapters draw on recent Chinese and English sources - on military doctrine, capabilities, and defense strategy - to build a clear understanding the main sources of U.S.-China misperceptions, and highlight the problems these assessments can create for the conduct of statecraft across strategically competitive geopolitical dyads. The book builds a sobering picture of U.S.-China relations that will appeal to specialists and generalists alike with an interest in future warfare, emerging military-technologies, military studies, arms control, and foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College

This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries

accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications. Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare. The Culture of Military Innovation offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.

Strategic Culture as the Sources of Military Changes Cornell University Press

The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in *Restraint*, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand

strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, *Restraint* explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America's consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.

THE MILITARY LENS

Cambridge University Press

The purpose of this book is to document from basic Soviet sources the development of Soviet military doctrine and its impact upon the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine is defined as the military policy of the Communist Party. In one way or another, this policy affects the lives of all of us—as a possible threat to free institutions and political processes as well as to our

economic life and well-being. Generally we approach Soviet military policy in terms of military balances and weapons: comparisons in the number of men under arms, the speed of aircraft of the Soviet bloc versus that of NATO aircraft, the number of ballistic missiles and their throw-weights. Studying such balances is of critical importance in defining, to some degree, existing forces. But it is only through a deep and thorough study of the military policy of the Communist Party, which translates directly into military doctrine, that we can obtain the background that might aid in negotiating with the Soviets on arms control matters or in making decisions that will enable those nations outside of the Soviet bloc to deter future Kremlin military moves.

The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76

Cornell University Press

Between 1991 and 1993, the Army formulated a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands of a new strategic world. This new power-order replaced the Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine, first issued in 1982. This monograph addresses several questions revolving around the rapid replacement, less than 2 years after its success in the desert war, of a recognized and successful fighting doctrine. Discusses the roots of U.S. Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the Army's recasting of its key battle doctrine. Examines the mechanism of the process of change, the effects of the new doctrine and how it was implemented.

The Sources of Military Doctrine Vigeo Press

Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military,

economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.

The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine Stanford University Press

In *The Military Lens*, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy—and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines—or "theories of victory"—differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn,

these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power. When states engage in strategic coercion—either to deter or to compel action—such problems can lead to escalation and war. Twomey assesses a wide array of sources in both the United States and China on military doctrine, strategic culture, misperception, and deterrence theory to build case studies of attempts at strategic coercion during Sino-American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the early years of the Cold War, as well as an examination of similar issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After demonstrating how these factors have contributed to past conflicts, Twomey amply documents the persistence of hazardous

miscommunication in contemporary Sino-American relations. His unique analytic perspective on military capability suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider the military doctrine of the nations they are trying to influence.

THE CULTURE OF MILITARY INNOVATION

Routledge

In this sobering book Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

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