

## Rethinking Intuition The Psychology Of Intuition And Its Role In Philosophical Inquiry

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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy  
 Experimental Philosophy and its Critics  
 Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind  
 Does Anything Really Matter?  
 Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics  
 Semantic Perception  
 A Companion to Experimental Philosophy  
 The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods  
 Seeing, Knowing, and Doing  
 Linguistic Intuitions  
 The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology  
 In Defense of Intuitions  
 Metaphysics and Cognitive Science  
 The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory  
 Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?  
 Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions  
 Philosophical Knowledge  
 Intuition  
 Rational Intuition  
 Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology  
 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology  
 Philosophy without Intuitions  
 Intuition: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide  
 The Routledge Companion to Epistemology

*Rethinking Intuition The Psychology Of Intuition And Its Role In Philosophical Inquiry*

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### MURRAY RANDOLPH

*The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy* Oxford University Press

Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about responsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents and their normatively structured contexts. This is the idea of circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility. Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will be revisionist, or at odds with important strands of ordinary convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical

and scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.

**Experimental Philosophy and its Critics** Oxford University Press, USA

Jody Azzouni argues that we involuntarily experience certain physical items, certain products of human actions, and certain human actions themselves as having meaning-properties. We understand these items as possessing meaning or as having (or being capable of having) truth values. For example, a sign on a door reading Drinks Inside strikes native English speakers as referring to liquids in the room behind the door. The sign has a truth value--if no drinks are found in the room, the sign is misleading. Someone pointing in a direction has the same effect: we experience her gesture as significant. Azzouni does not suggest that we don't recognize the expectations or intentions of speakers (including ourselves); we do recognize that the person pointing in a certain direction intends for us to understand her gesture's significance.

Nevertheless, Azzouni asserts that we experience that gesture as having significance independent of her intentions. The gesture is meaningful on its own. The same is true of language, both spoken and written. We experience the meanings of language artifacts as independent of their makers' intentions in the same way that we experience an object's shape as a property independent of the object's color. There is a distinctive phenomenology to the experience of understanding language, and Semantic Perception shows how this phenomenology can be brought to bear as evidence for and against competing theories of language.

*Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind* Oxford University Press

Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers'

intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental philosophy is brought yet another step forward by engaging some of its most renowned proponents and critics in a lively and controversial debate. In addition to that, the volume also contains original experimental research on personal identity and philosophical temperament, as well as state-of-the-art essays on central metaphilosophical issues, like thought experiments, the nature of intuitions, or the status of philosophical expertise. This book was originally published as a special issue of *Philosophical Psychology*.

**Does Anything Really Matter?** Rowman & Littlefield

This book examines the evidential status and use of linguistic intuitions, a topic that has seen increased interest in recent years. Linguists use native speakers' intuitions - such as whether or not an utterance sounds acceptable - as evidence for theories about language, but this approach is not uncontroversial. The two parts of this volume draw on the most recent work in both philosophy and linguistics to explore the two major issues at the heart of the debate. Chapters in the first part address the 'justification question', critically analysing and evaluating the theoretical rationale for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions. The second part discusses recent developments in the domain of experimental syntax, focusing on the question of whether gathering intuitions experimentally is epistemically and methodologically superior to the informal methods that have traditionally been used. The volume provides valuable insights into whether and how linguistic

intuitions can be used in theorizing about language, and will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science.

*Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics* Oxford University Press, USA

The past decade has witnessed an exciting (and controversial) new approach to philosophy:

Experimental philosophers aim to supplement, and perhaps to supplant, traditional philosophical approaches by employing empirical methods from the social sciences. In *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind*, leading experimental philosophers apply these methods to questions about the nature of the mind, the self, consciousness, moral judgment, and concepts. By bringing empirical methods to bear on key issues, *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind* pushes the debates forward, casting new insight on perennial problems. This is an essential resource for professors, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates interested in either philosophy of mind or the burgeoning field of experimental philosophy.

### SEMANTIC PERCEPTION

Springer Science & Business Media

This is a comprehensive collection of essays that explores cutting-edge work in experimental philosophy, a radical new movement that applies quantitative and empirical methods to traditional topics of philosophical inquiry. Situates the discipline within Western philosophy and then surveys the work of experimental philosophers by sub-discipline. Contains insights for a diverse range of fields, including linguistics, cognitive science, anthropology, economics, and psychology, as well as almost every area of professional philosophy today. Edited by two rising scholars who take a broad and inclusive approach to the field. Offers a complete introduction for non-specialists and students to the central approaches, findings, challenges, and controversies in experimental philosophy. *A Companion to Experimental Philosophy* OUP USA

We know about our immediate environment—about the people, animals, and things around us—by having sensory perceptions. According to a tradition that traces back to Plato, we know about abstract reality—about mathematics, morality, and metaphysics—by having intuitions, which can be thought of as intellectual perceptions. The rough idea behind the analogy is this: while sensory perceptions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in concrete reality by making us aware of that reality through the senses, intuitions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. In this book, Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends such a view of intuition. He focuses on the experience of having an intuition, on the justification for beliefs that derives from intuition, and on the contact with abstract reality via intuition. In the course of developing a systematic account of the phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics of intuition on which it counts as a form of intellectual perception Chudnoff also takes up related issues such as the a priori, perceptual justification and knowledge, concepts and understanding, inference, mental action, and skeptical challenges to intuition.

*The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods* Oxford University Press

The title of this book refers to the tension between formal and informal elements in the ways analytical philosophy is practiced. The authors examine questions of the scopes and limits of both kinds of research methods.

*Seeing, Knowing, and Doing* Rodopi

Is torturing the innocent OK? Just now something happened: it seemed to you that torturing the innocent is wrong. What kind of mental state were you in? What is its nature? Perhaps you now believe that torturing the innocent is wrong because it just seemed to you that it is. If so, that seems appropriate. But is it really, and if so, what could explain this? In this book, Koksvik argues these mental states form a psychological kind called ‘intuition’, and that having an intuition indeed justifies you in believing what it says. What explains this, he argues, is how similar intuition is to perception. Through a detailed examination he shows that intuition, just like perception, is a conscious experience, and that the two experience types have important properties in common, in virtue of which they can both justify belief. In sharp contrast to traditional thought, Koksvik argues that intuition is completely unrestricted in content: we have intuitions about morality and metaphysics, but also about all sorts of everyday things, like danger or trustworthiness, and in all cases they can justify. The use of intuition is thus not only a legitimate part of philosophical and scientific practice, it also plays a pervasive, important and legitimate role in all of our everyday rational lives.

### LINGUISTIC INTUITIONS

OUP Oxford

The rise of experimental philosophy is generating pressing methodological questions for philosophers. Can findings from experimental studies hold any significance for philosophy as a discipline? Can philosophical theorizing be improved through consideration of such studies? Do these studies threaten traditional philosophical methodology? *Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology* addresses these questions, presenting a variety of views on the potential roles experimental philosophy might play in philosophical debate. Featuring contributors from experimental philosophy, as well as those who have expressed criticism of the experimental philosophy movement, this volume reflects on the nature of philosophy itself: its goals, its methods, and its possible future evolution. Tackling two major themes, contributors discuss the recent controversy over the degree to which intuition plays a major role in philosophical methodology and the characterization of the role of the experimental philosophy project. They also look at the relationship between so-called ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ projects and examine possible links between experimental and mainstream philosophical problems. Close discussion of these themes contributes to the overall goal of the volume: an investigation into the current significance and possible future applications of experimental work in philosophy.

**The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology** Springer

The volume provides clear and comprehensive coverage of the main methodological debates and approaches within philosophy. The book gives equal weight to analytical and continental approaches, and pays attention to approaches that are often overlooked.

### IN DEFENSE OF INTUITIONS

Oxford University Press

A defense of traditional philosophical method against challenges from practitioners of “experimental philosophy.” In *The Myth of the Intuitive*, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore,” and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.

### METAPHYSICS AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE

CUA Press

This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of metaphysics to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues to which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. A number of chapters address the enterprise of metaphysics in general. In traditional analytical metaphysics, intuitions play a prominent role in the construction of, and assessment of theories. Cognitive science can be brought to bear on the issue of the reliability of intuitions. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions. Many metaphysicians have taken to heart the moral that physics should be taken into account in addressing certain metaphysical issues. The overarching point of

the volume is that in many instances beyond the nature of the mind itself, cognitive science should also be consulted.

*The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory* Springer

Rational Intuition explores the concept of intuition as it relates to rationality through mediums of history, philosophy, cognitive science, and psychology.

### PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY: THE ARMCHAIR OR THE LABORATORY?

Bloomsbury Publishing

At a time when both scholars and the public demand explanations and answers to key economic problems that conventional approaches have failed to resolve, this groundbreaking handbook of original works by leading behavioral economists offers the first comprehensive articulation of behavioral economics theory. Borrowing from the findings of psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, legal scholars, and biologists, among others, behavioral economists find that intelligent individuals often tend not to behave as effectively or efficiently in their economic decisions as long held by conventional wisdom. The manner in which individuals actually do behave critically depends on psychological, institutional, cultural, and even biological considerations. “Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics” includes coverage of such critical areas as the Economic Agent, Context and Modeling, Decision Making, Experiments and Implications, Labor Issues, Household and Family Issues, Life and Death, Taxation, Ethical Investment and Tipping, and Behavioral Law and Macroeconomics. Each contribution includes an extensive bibliography.

*Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions* OUP Oxford

This book focuses on the very nature and function of intuitive thought. It presents an up-to-date scientific model on how the non-conscious and intuitive thought processes work in human beings. The model is based on mainstream theorizing on intuition, as well as qualitative meta-analysis of the empirical data available in the research literature. It combines recent work in the fields of philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and positive psychology. While systematic research in intuition is relatively new, there is an abundance of positions advocating more or less imaginative ideas of what intuition is about, ranging from quantum mechanical phenomena to new age ideologies. Research in the past few decades, in particular by proponents of the dual processing theory of thought such as Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Evans, offers powerful tools to address and evaluate the question of intuition without the need to resort to spiritual entities. Within the framework of the dual processing theory, backed up by findings in positive psychology, intuition turns out to be the capacity to carry out complex cognitive operations within a specific domain of operations familiar to the agent.

*Philosophical Knowledge* Springer

The former Queen of Science seems to be lacking both a specific subject and a particular method. Thus the need arises for intra- and metaphilosophical orientation – especially since the way philosophy sees itself stems from various influential schools and traditions whose mutual exchange is not as lively as one might have hoped. This volume of original essays brings together some of the protagonists of different metaphilosophical debates that have so far been led fairly independently of each other. The authors discuss the question of both the possibility and the scope of philosophical knowledge under a variety of aspects, particularly: (1) a priori knowledge and the role of intuitions, (2) transcendental arguments, (3) analytic philosophy and its methods as well as (4) phenomenology and analytic philosophy.

*Intuition* Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG

This collection is a major contribution to the understanding and evaluation of Ernest Sosa’s profound and wide-ranging philosophy, in epistemology and beyond. A balanced, fair and critical volume, it offers a sensitive appreciation of his wide philosophical purview, a nuanced assessment of the detail of his thought, and a spur to exploring the linkages between the varied topics explored by the subtle mind of this great American scholar. The papers explore a wealth of Sosa’s academic interests, including his work on philosophical method, the philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and value theory, in addition to his output on epistemology itself. It offers, for example, a rebuttal of the counterarguments to Sosa’s reliabilist theory of introspective justification, which itself concludes with some objections to Sosa’s stated views on the ‘speckled hen’ problem. Other authors track the connections of his virtue theory to his advocacy of bi-level epistemology, provide reflections on Sosa’s views on the epistemological tradition, and examine the nexus of his beliefs on intuition and philosophical methodology. This volume is an insightful reckoning of Sosa’s academic account.

Rational Intuition Cambridge University Press

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology (including logical empiricism, phenomenology, and ordinary language philosophy). The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as

intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience.

*Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology* Bloomsbury Publishing

This book focuses on the role of intuition in querying Socratic problems, the very nature of intuition itself, and whether it can be legitimately used to support or reject philosophical theses. The reader is introduced to questions connected to the use of intuition in philosophy through an analysis of

two methods where the appeal to intuition is explicit: thought experiments and reflective equilibrium. In addition, the debate on the legitimacy of such an appeal is presented as connected to the discussion on the nature of the aims and results of philosophical inquiries. Finally, the main tenets and results of experimental philosophers are discussed, highlighting the methodological limits of such studies. Readers interested in the nature of intuition in philosophy will find this an invaluable and revealing resource.

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